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Abstract 
Legitimate as well as illegitimate organizations and entities are gaining access to information 
about social media (SM) users through illegal, extralegal, and quasi-legal means. Worse still, 
many organizations and individuals using SM have become targets and victims of cybercrimes. 
SM have also led to an exposure of unethical and illegal conducts within some organizations. 
One estimate suggested that 36% of social networking users have reported experiencing mal-
ware attacks through their profiles. Another study suggested that one in four companies have 
become cybercrime victims via social networking sites. Likewise, about a quarter of employers 
surveyed by the Society of Corporate Compliance and Ethics in 2009 had disciplined an em-
ployee for improper activities on social networking sites. Organizations that fail to take appropri-
ate technological and behavioral measures related to SM are likely to suffer reputation damages, 
loss of customers' confidence, and other types of economic losses. The goal of this paper is to 
develop a framework that provides a simple, explicit mechanism for understanding privacy and 
security issues associated with SM.  To achieve this goal, we draw upon literatures on diverse 
areas such as institutional theory, marketing and criminology. Specifically, we examine how var-
ious institutions from the standpoint of SM superimpose in a unique interaction with SM related 
technologies’ natures that influence businesses’ and consumers’ privacy and security.  We dis-
cuss how various features of SM related technologies such as newness (leading to ineffective-
ness of existing IT security   products), complexity (difficulty to understand SM’s functioning) 
and attractiveness of SM as a cybercrime target (availability of information with superior tar-
getability and huge size and rapid growth of SM). We also examine how regulative institutions 
(lack of laws to deal with SM as well as lack of enforcement of existing laws), normative institu-
tions (lack of ethical and professional guidelines) and cognitive institutions (lack of precautionary 
measures and lack of defensive measures or counterpoison) have contributed to a lack of be-
havioral and attitudinal measures to ensure privacy and security. 
 
Keywords: Social Media, Rare Enemy Syndrome, Targetability, Privacy and Security, Institu-
tions
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Introduction 
The rapid growth of social media (SM) has 
posed fundamental security and privacy chal-
lenges. SM have attracted various actors that 
engage in illegal, extra-legal, and sometimes 
criminal activities. As evidenced by the recent 
attacks on Twitter, Facebook, and MySpace, 
cyber-criminals are exploiting the viral nature 
of Web 2.0 and social networking sites 
(Kshetri, 2010a). In April 2010, the U.K.’s 
Nottinghamshire Police reported that crimes 
associated with Facebook that were reported 
to the agency (e.g., sex crimes, verbal abuse, 
assault) increased by 346% during the previ-
ous 22 months (Peppiatt, 2010). According to 
Kaspersky Lab, in the first quarter of 2010, 
Facebook was the No. 4 most targeted site 
by phishers, after PayPal, eBay and HSBC 
(Richmond, 2010).  
Preliminary studies indicate a high rate of re-
turns associated with organizations’ imple-
mentation of SM for marketing activities. A 
study conducted by vitrue (http://vitrue.com/) 
indicated that in the average the value of a 
'Fan' on SM is $3.60 (Morrissey, 2010). Yet 
privacy and security concerns have hindered 
organizations’ adoption of SM. For instance, 
companies are increasingly limiting their em-
ployees’ access to social networking sites. 
Yet, about a quarter of employers surveyed 
by the Society of Corporate Compliance and 
Ethics in 2009 had disciplined at least one 
employee for improper activities on social 
networking sites (Chen, 2010). A survey 
commissioned by Robert Half Technology 
found that 21 % of chief information officers 
have limited the personal use of SM sites in 
the workplace. Note that a previous survey 
commissioned by Robert Half Technology 
found that 58 % of companies have banned 
SM sites altogether (Magder, 2010). A study 
by Sophos indicates that 12-17% of organiza-
tions surveyed control access to social net-
working sites due to concerns related to mal-
ware and data leakage (Lardinois, 2009). 
Experts argue that in order to prevent cyber-
crimes, it is important for users and platform 
owners to consider the ethical, legal, and 
technical issues associated with SM (Chre-
tien, Ryan, Chretien and Kind, 2009; Lagu, 
Kaufman, Asch, and Armstrong, 2010; Ram-
sey and Venkatesan, 2010; Thompson, Daw-
son and Ferdig, 2008). The productive use of 
SM in marketing activities, tempered with an 
appropriate level of privacy and security, is a 
strategic policy action item, and, a theoretical 
issue that adjoins broad-based substantive 
interests within marketing to various social 
science disciplines. Although prior research-
ers have acknowledged the role of SM, they 
have paid relatively less attention to how pri-
vacy and security issues are affecting the dif-
fusion patterns of SM. Thus, it is important for 
managers to better understand privacy and 
security issues associated with SM. 
The purpose of our study is to contribute to 
filling this void. We examine how institutional 
and technological environments are linked to 
behavioral and attitudinal measures to ensure 
privacy and security in SM. We develop a 
framework that provides a simple, explicit 
mechanism for understanding privacy and 
security issues associated with SM.  To 
achieve this goal, we draw upon literatures on 
diverse areas such as institutional theory, 
marketing, and criminology. 
The paper is structured as follows. We pro-
ceed by first providing a brief survey of priva-
cy and security concerns associated with SM. 
Next, we examine the institutional and tech-
nological environments and relevant issues 
facing SM. Then, we discuss privacy and se-
curity issues within the context of the specific 
environments and provide some practical im-
plications. The final section provides conclud-
ing comments. 
Privacy and Security Concerns 
Associated with SM: A Survey 
The rise in privacy and security breaches in 
SM can be treated as part of a larger trend of 
the rapid growth in the global cybercrime in-
dustry (Kshetri, 2010a). Due to the govern-
ment’s constant public announcements of 
internet security breaches and pending cyber-
terrorism, there is a heightened sense of fear 
and anxiety about cybercrimes involving SM 
among individuals and businesses. In this 
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section, we organize the discussion by focus-
ing separately on privacy and security issues 
facing businesses and consumers and also 
on various forms of cybercrimes associated 
with SM, which can be considered as a con-
ceptual superset of privacy and security is-
sues. 
Impacts on businesses 
A survey conducted by IBM found that U.S. 
businesses worry more about cybercrimes 
than about physical crimes (Christian Science 
Monitor, 2006). One estimate suggested that 
one in four companies report attacks via so-
cial networking sites (Kaplan, 2009). Adver-
tisers have been complaining about click 
fraud of up to 100% (Techcrunch.com, 2009).  
Note that a large proportion of Facebook rev-
enue comes from pay-per-click (PPC) adver-
tising from small self-serve advertisers. It is 
reported that some advertisers spend 
$30,000 a day on ads on Facebook (Arring-
ton, 2009).  SM are also associated with 
threats such as phishing and the leakage of 
intellectual property (Kavur, 2010).  According 
to a study by Open DNS (www.opendns.com) 
Facebook was the second biggest phishing 
target after PayPal and was the most blocked 
website by companies (Cooter, 2011). 
Impacts on consumers 
An IBM survey released in 2006 found that 
there were three times more Americans, who 
thought they would be more likely victims of a 
computer crime “in the next year” than of a 
physical crime (Keizer, 2006). According to 
Consumer Reports’ State of the Net survey 
released in May 2010, 9% of social network 
users experienced some forms of abuse with-
in the past year (e.g., malware infections, 
scams, identity theft or harassment) (Wool-
lacott, 2010). In June 2009, laptops of several 
business school students at Yale University 
were simultaneously infected, which was 
suspected to have spread through Facebook 
(Finkle, 2009). Cyber-criminals have also tar-
geted Twitter users by using links with mal-
ware that tag current topics (Voigt, 2009).  
Cyber-criminals’ actions are centered around 
popular SM activities. One of them, for in-
stance, is online games. A Cisco study re-
leased in July 2010 indicated that 7% of Fa-
cebook users across the world access the 
site to play the interactive game, Farmville, 
which its users spend an average of 68 
minutes a day on virtual farming. Likewise, 
another game, Mafia Wars, is played by 5% 
of Facebook users daily. Each user that 
played Mafia Wars spent 52 minutes on the 
game while at work. Cisco believes that 
cyber-criminals are developing ways to deliv-
er malware via these games (The Straits 
Times, 2010). 
Types and classification of cyber-
crimes associated with SM 
Glaser (1971) identified and classified various 
types of crimes, including: predatory crimes 
against property, predatory crimes against 
person, illegal service crimes, and public dis-
order crimes. Most of these can be extended 
in the context of the cyberspace, more specif-
ically into SM. Cyber attacks can be classified 
using various criteria. One way to classify 
them is to consider whether they are directed 
against an intended target (e.g., targeted and 
opportunistic attacks) or are just broad-stroke 
targeting.  Cyber attacks can also be classi-
fied into two categories based on whether 
they are predatory or market-based. A further 
way to classify cybercrimes is related to the 
relative roles of human and technology ele-
ments-- Type I and Type II cybercrimes. 
Targeted vs. opportunistic attacks 
In targeted attacks, specific tools are used 
against specific SM targets. Targeted attacks 
are carried out by skilled hackers with exper-
tise to do serious damages. Some of them 
are motivated by financial gains. Targeted 
attacks are also initiated by terrorists, rival 
companies (e.g., click frauds in Facebook), 
ideological hackers and/or government agen-
cies. Hackers that were initially involved in 
mass attacks are moving towards more so-
phisticated focused attacks that target SM 
sites. 
Opportunistic attacks, on the other hand, en-
tail releasing worms and viruses that spread 
indiscriminately across the Internet. Oppor-
3
Kshetri: Privacy and Security Aspects of Social Media: Institutional and T
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012
Privacy and Security Aspects of Social Media: Institutional and Technological Environment / Kshetri 
Pacific Asia Journal of the Association for Information Systems Vol. 3 No. 4, pp.1-20 / December 2011 4 
tunistic attacks are less dangerous than tar-
geted attacks and have smaller financial 
ramifications. 
Predatory cybercrimes vs. market-based 
cybercrimes  
Cybercrimes can also be grouped into two 
types: predatory cybercrimes for profit and 
market-based cybercrimes (Naylor, 2005). 
Predatory cybercrimes can be defined as ille-
gal acts in the cyberspace in which "someone 
definitely and intentionally takes or damages 
the person or property of another" (Glaser, 
1971).  An example could be stealing money 
from someone’s bank account using the in-
formation fraudulently received from SM us-
ers. From the national GNP point of view, 
these acts do not produce new goods or ser-
vices. They simply redistribute the existing 
wealth. Market-based cybercrimes, on the 
other hand, generate new incomes rather 
than redistributing the existing wealth (Naylor, 
2005). Such crimes occur, for example, in the 
sales of stolen credit card information and 
illegal drugs online. 
Type I and Type II cybercrimes involving 
SM 
Gordon and Ford (2006) have divided cyber-
crime into distinct categories. In their catego-
rization, Type I cybercrime mostly contains 
technological elements, such as malware at-
tacks via social-networking sites, which are 
growing in volume recently (Whitney, 2010). 
A study estimated that 36% of social network-
ing users reported experiencing malware at-
tacks through their profiles (Tuazon and Mark, 
2010). It should be noted that login details 
from social networking websites can also be 
bought in the underground economy. The 
Sydney Morning Herald (2010) reported that 
a Russian hacker known as “Kirllos,” who 
was living in New Zealand, was offering the 
login details (i.e. usernames and passwords) 
of 1.5 million Facebook users. The price was 
NZ$62.70 (about US$ 44) per 1000 accounts 
sold on an underground hacker forum.  
Type II cybercrimes have mainly human ele-
ments (Gordon and Ford, 2006). Turning now 
to the specific context of cybercrimes target-
ing SM sites, it is important to note that 
crimes such as "Facebook phishing" are ris-
ing. It is possible that a cyber-criminal may 
claim to be a friend and convince a Facebook 
user to share his/her password. This is a very 
serious security breach since over 50% Fa-
cebook users were found to employ the same 
password for their individual bank accounts 
(Rodgers, 2009). 
Institutional and Technological Envi-
ronment Facing SM 
As a visual aid, Figure 1 schematically repre-
sents how privacy and security issues in SM, 
and more broadly cybercrimes, are tightly 
linked to the institutional and technological 
environment. We discuss building blocks of 
the model in this section. An understanding of 
model would help organizations take techno-
logical, behavioral and perceptual/attitudinal 
measures to combat the threat of cybercrime.  
Organizations that fail to take appropriate 
technological and behavioral measures relat-
ed to SM are likely to suffer reputation dam-
ages, loss of customers' confidence, and oth-
er types of economic losses (Figure 1). 
Technological Environment 
A firm’s strategy is tightly linked to the tech-
nological environment within which it is oper-
ating (Audretsch, 1991).  In this paper’s con-
text, we discuss three main characteristics of 
technologies enabling SM: newness, com-
plexity, and superior targetability. Let’s take a 
look at each of the components in turn. 
Newness 
The number of malware products targeting 
social networking sites is increasing rapidly. 
One estimate suggested that the number of 
malware products spreading via social net-
working sites increased from about 10,000 in 
2007 to over 25,000 during 2008 (Tanase, 
2010). Cyber-criminals are attracted by SM 
sites’ economies of scale and effectiveness. 
Due to the newness of SM, however, most 
existing IT security products are ineffective. 
Many SM sites are found to contain vulnera-
bilities that are undetectable and untraceable 
to most available security technologies.  
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Figure 1 - A framework for understanding security and privacy issues facing SM 
For instance, IT security products (such as, 
Web filtering, firewalls and network security 
devices) are inadequate to deal with malware 
targeting SM sites (Kavur, 2010). In sum, 
conventional security software is of little help 
to deal with vulnerabilities involving SM (Null, 
2001). 
Complexity  
Another problem concerns the difficulty in un-
derstanding SM’s functioning. Experts have, 
for instance, complained that SM users are 
not given simple ways to understand “what 
personal information is being made available 
to whom” (Marks, 2010). Cowan (2010) has 
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summarized complexity in Facebook’s priva-
cy measures best: “Rapid growth, a pile-up of 
new features and ad hoc responses to previ-
ous privacy concerns meant the site's privacy 
controls had become maddeningly complex, 
with users required to navigate 50 different 
settings and 170 different options”.   
We can further illustrate SM’s complexity with 
an example of Facebook ads. Before we pro-
ceed, it is important to note that Facebook 
served 176.3 billion ads in the first quarter of 
2010, which is more than by Yahoo (Cowan, 
2010).  Note that ads work differently in Fa-
cebook compared to search engines such as 
Google and yahoo. While an ad can be seen 
on the parked domain page, or when an In-
ternet users types in a keyword, it may not be 
possible to see a Facebook ad. This is be-
cause Facebook ads are “hyper targeted” 
based on “deep demographic data” (Tanase, 
2010). For instance, using the self-serve ads, 
an advertiser can target “users that are fe-
male, aged 13-17, and, who live in San Fran-
cisco” (Cutler and Marshal, 2009).  A user 
that does not fit this profile does not see the 
ad.  
Facebook advertisers have claimed that their 
ads are clicked by competitors, leading to 
higher costs   (Arrington, 2009). A high level 
of complexity may make it difficult for an ad-
vertiser to track fraudulent activities associat-
ed with an ad.  
The rise of cybercrimes targeting social net-
work users is also associated with and facili-
tated by the proliferation of third party appli-
cations on various SM platforms (Ramsey 
and Venkatesan, 2010). For one thing, they 
have increased complexity. Many such appli-
cations allow users to store, organize and 
exchange information. In April 2010, Face-
book started giving third-party applications 
more access to user data (Fletcher and Ford, 
2010). Some Apps, which used to be allowed 
to keep user data only for 24 hours, can store 
them indefinitely unless users uninstall them. 
Facebook Instant Personalization launched in 
spring 2010 lets businesses create recom-
mendation based on user data (Fletcher and 
Ford, 2010).  
Most impressive, as of July 2010, the inde-
pendent developer, Zynga was estimated to 
have 235 million active Facebook users a 
month playing games developed by the com-
pany (foreign.peacefmonline.com, 2010). A 
common complaint about many applications 
developed by independent programmers, 
however, is that there has been a lack of 
basic security measures and procedures in 
these apps (Soghoian, 2008). Worse still, 
some are designed to steal personal infor-
mation. A case in point is the Facebook ap-
plication, “Dislike” button recently created by 
a third-party developer.  This was reported to 
be a malware, which created revenue for its 
developer when users completed a survey. It 
also gave the developer access to personal 
data and used Facebook accounts for gener-
ating spam messages (Pert, 2010). In August 
2010, Facebook Security (http://www.faceboo 
k.com/security) issued a warning about the 
bogus Dislike button scam.   
Targetability 
In the context of this paper, targetability is 
related to a legitimate or illegitimate organiza-
tion’s capability to reach an attractive target. 
Attractiveness of SM as a cybercrime target 
Two explanations related to attractiveness of 
SM can be suggested for the rapid growth of 
cybercrimes targeting SM. A simple, straight-
forward explanation is that cyber-criminals 
consider SM sites as a lucrative target due to 
their rapid growth. One estimate suggested 
that, as of July 2010, 74% of the world’s In-
ternet population visited social networking 
sites, and in the average, Internet users spent 
an average of six hours per month on such 
sites (nielsen.com, 2010).  The number of 
people using Facebook reached 500 million 
on 21 July 2010 (Pepitone, 2010). Particularly, 
South Korea’s leading social media site, 
Naver, was reported to attract 95% of the 
country’s Internet population every month 
(nielsen.com, 2010). Likewise, eight out of 
the top 20 websites in the UAE incorporate 
SM elements (McArthur, 2010). 
A second factor related to attractiveness (and 
often associated with privacy violation and 
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security breaches on SM sites) is data quality. 
Data and information that is available on such 
sites are of superior quality. Unsurprisingly, 
legitimate enterprises, as well, as criminal 
outfits find it too tempting to self-regulate, and 
often actively seek to covertly gain access to 
the best quality information available in SM 
networks. It is important to note that target 
attractiveness depends on offenders’ percep-
tions of victims (Kshetri, 2010a). A lawsuit 
filed in August 2009 five individuals in the Or-
ange County Superior Court claimed that Fa-
cebook’s business model is “designed to har-
vest as much personal and private infor-
mation as possible in easiest, quickest, and 
most innocuous-looking manner possible”, 
which is shared with “third parties for com-
mercial purposes and economic benefit” 
(softpedia.com, 2009).  
Prior research indicates that crime opportuni-
ty is a function of target attractiveness, which 
is measured in monetary or symbolic value 
and portability (Clarke, 1995). In this regard, 
availability of information with superior tar-
getability, as well as, huge size and rapid 
growth make SM as an attractive target for 
cyber-criminals. In summary, SM’s popularity, 
as well, as the amount and quality of infor-
mation stored on SM platforms make them an 
attractive cybercrime target (Ramsey and 
Venkatesan, 2010). 
Institutional Environment 
Institutions are defined as “macro-level rules 
of the game” (North, 1990, p. 27), which con-
sist of "formal constraints (rules, laws, consti-
tutions), informal constraints (norms of be-
havior, conventions, and self-imposed codes 
of conduct), and their enforcement character-
istics" (North, 1996). Institutional theory is 
described as “a theory of legitimacy seeking” 
(Dickson, BeShers and Gupta, 2004). To gain 
legitimacy, organizations adopt behaviors ir-
respective of the effect on organizational effi-
ciency (Campbell, 2004). For instance, it was 
reported that in China, Microsoft blocks blog-
gers from posting politically objectionable 
words and, when Google was operating in the 
country, it shut down when users looked for 
sensitive words. 
Institutional influence on the SM industry be-
comes an admittedly complex process (Dick-
son, BeShers and Gupta, 2004) when organi-
zations have to derive legitimacy from multi-
ple sources such as employees, clients, local 
communities, professional and trade associa-
tions and governments. Scott (2001) pro-
posed three institutional pillars: (i) regulative; 
(ii) normative and (iii) cognitive. These pillars 
relate to “legally sanctioned”, “morally gov-
erned” and “recognizable, taken-for-granted” 
behaviors respectively (Scott, Ruef, Mendel, 
and Caronna, 2000). 
An important point to note is that institutional 
actors’ responses lag behind the technologi-
cal changes (Brenner, 2004; Katyal, 2001; 
Kshetri, 2010a). This can be attributed to in-
stitutional inertia.  Moreover, institutional ac-
tors vary in their timing of responses to a giv-
en change in technology. 
Regulative Institutions 
Lack of laws to deal with SM 
The SM industry legal system is evolving 
more slowly compared to the SM technology 
development. As of August 2010, only three 
countries in the world-- the UK, New Zealand 
and Australia-- had developed legal frame-
work on the use of SM for litigation purposes 
(Kowalski, 2010). In August 2010, Singa-
pore’s Supreme Court has released a Con-
sultation Paper on the use of SM for litigation 
purposes including service of documents 
(Supreme Court of Singapore 2010). Singa-
pore is expected to be the fourth country to 
have a comprehensive legal framework on 
SM.  
Until 2009, the U.S. did not have a law which 
held marketers liable for false statements 
published on blogs and social networking 
websites. In 2009, the FTC revised its Guides 
Concerning the Use of Endorsements and 
Testimonials in Advertising. The revision de-
fined instances in which a blogger’s relation-
ship with a company is necessary to disclose 
to avoid misleading consumers (Sullivan, 
2009).  This was the FTC’s first revision in its 
guidelines for endorsements and testimonials 
since 1980 (Kee, 2009). 
7
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Moreover, some economies’ existing laws 
have been ineffective to deal with fraudulent 
activities associated with SM.  For instance, 
consider differences between the approaches 
of China and the U.S in dealing with astroturf-
ing  in SM. Note that astroturfing  is political, 
advertising, or public relations campaigns that 
are formally planned by an organization, but 
are designed to mask the nature of the origi-
nator in an attempt to create the illusion of 
being spontaneous, popular, and "grassroots" 
behavior. SM have opened a new avenue for 
astroturfers. It was reported that, in New York 
State, a cosmetic surgery company had its 
employees pretend to be satisfied customers 
in writing online testimonials. In 2009, the 
New York attorney general received a 
$300,000 settlement from the company for 
this action (Lazar, 2010).  
Similarly, a Business Week article (June 23, 
2008) reported that China’s public relations 
firms such as Daqi.com, Chinese Web Union 
and CIC charge US$500-25,000 monthly to 
monitor online posts. They help minimize the 
impact of negative information and create 
positive brand value for the company. There 
are reports that these PR firms hire students 
to write good posts about certain brands and 
to criticize the competition.  While critics are 
concerned about the manipulation of con-
sumer reviews and paid reviews, Astroturfers 
in China haven’t faced legal problems.  
One way to understand the China-U.S. differ-
ence is to consider their experiences with 
modern capitalism. Many successful firms in 
mature market economies are guided by cus-
tomer orientation and demonstrate their 
commitment to customer focus. Customers in 
these economies exhibit a low tolerance for 
acceptance of poor behavior if businesses 
and suppliers do not fulfill their implicit and 
explicit commitments. Due to China's short 
history of modern capitalism, Chinese clients, 
and customers are more likely to tolerate an 
absence of business ethics and a low level of 
product and service quality and/or reliability.   
Improper enforcement of laws 
Brenner (2004) notes: “. . . the traditional 
model of law enforcement is a compilation of 
past practices that have been deemed effec-
tive in dealing with the phenomena it con-
fronts. The model’s general strategy, the re-
active approach, is one that has been in use 
since antiquity”. Such an approach has been 
highly ineffective in the SM industry since SM 
crosses all borders.  
In addition to incomplete regulation, criticisms 
of improper enforcement are also significant. 
There have been concerns about possible 
overreach by law enforcement agencies. In 
the U.S., for instance, thanks to the 2001 Pa-
triot Act, the federal government can ask ser-
vice providers to submit personal details of an 
Internet user’s online activities without telling 
the Internet user about it. The FBI's internal 
audits indicated the possibility of “overreach-
ing” by the agency in accessing Internet us-
ers’ information (Zittrain, 2009). Unlike the 
U.S., the Chinese government has no limit on 
covert monitoring of its citizenry.  The Chi-
nese version of Skype instant messaging 
software is used to monitor texting conversa-
tions and will actively block undesirable 
words and phrases (Zittrain, 2009). 
The FBI is reported to be in dilemma regard-
ing the use of fake identities to investigate 
cybercrimes on SM. According to a FBI doc-
ument reported by Hoover (2010), despite the 
potential of undercover operations in gaining 
access to private information, the agency has 
expressed concerns that undercover use of 
personal information may be complicated. If 
the agents do not use their own name, such 
information gathering can be considered un-
authorized and/or illegal. The agency cited 
complications over Lori Drew’s trial, who was 
acquitted of cyber-bullying a teen who later 
committed suicide.  
The e-commerce industry is undergoing a 
major technological upheaval. In such situa-
tions, for various actors, the institutional con-
text may not provide organizing templates, 
models for action, and sources of legitimacy 
(Greenwood and Hinings, 1993). In most 
cases, such changes create confusion and 
uncertainty and produce an environment that 
lacks norms, templates, and models about 
appropriate strategies and structures (New-
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man, 2000). A lack of regulatory templates is 
reflected in substantively inconsistent re-
sponses of major SM companies to law en-
forcement requests. Hoover (2010) summa-
rizes the FBI’s experiences in dealing with the 
top three social networking sites:  
…… .Facebook is "often cooperative" with 
law enforcement emergency requests for in-
formation, while MySpace requires law en-
forcement to provide a search warrant to see 
private messages less than 181 days old. 
Twitter, meanwhile, is apparently even less 
helpful than MySpace, as the presentation 
notes it has no contact number for law en-
forcement to call, only retains the last log-in 
IP address, has no guide for law enforce-
ment, and will not produce data without a 
warrant or subpoena. 
Normative Institutions 
Lack of ethical and professional guidelines 
Cisco chief security officer John N. Stewart 
observed that organizations tend to be slower 
in the introduction of data integrity policies 
compared to consumers’ adoption of new 
technology (The Straits Times, 2010). The 
same is true of professional associations. 
Professional and ethical guidelines regarding 
posts on social networking have not been 
well-developed. In the medical world, for in-
stance, there arguably is a lack of clear 
guidelines as to what constitutes an unethical 
or unprofessional online conduct for physi-
cians (Lagu, Kaufman and Asch, 2004; 
Thompson, Dawson and Ferdig, 2008).  
Illegal or questionable activities such as viola-
tion of patient confidentiality are taking place 
in the social networking sites without the vio-
lators’ intent.  In a survey conducted among 
U.S. medical schools to assess professional-
ism in medical students’ online posts, 60% of 
the respondents reported incidents of their 
medical students posting online content that 
were unprofessional and 13% violated patient 
confidentiality. The study also found that only 
few schools had policies to deal with such 
violations. Illegal or questionable activities 
(such as, violation of patient confidentiality) 
are taking place in the social networking sites 
without the violators’ knowledge or intent 
(Chretien, Ryan, Chretien and Kind, 2009). 
Many app developers have also failed to fol-
low ethical guidelines and principles. The 
Hong Kong-based developer, Pencake had 
developed the popular "Create Your Quiz" 
app, which was Facebook's No. 3 most popu-
lar outside developer behind Zynga and Elec-
tronic Arts. In July 2010, Facebook an-
nounced that it disabled Pencake’s apps be-
cause Pencake had allegedly violated the 
"main principles" of Facebook’s platform poli-
cies and codes of ethics. Facebook’s code of 
ethics requires that a user must not spam or 
infringe on members' privacy.  
We cannot really take the deletion of a single 
developer’s apps as "proof positive" that SM 
providers, such as Facebook, may be serious 
about ensuring security and privacy of users’ 
information. Cowan (2010) argues: “[w]hile 
Facebook doesn't sell users' information to 
advertisers, it remains unclear what happens 
to the personal data harvested by the dozens 
of games, quizzes, personality tests and oth-
er time wasters that clutter Facebook”.  
Prior researchers have suggested that less 
visible players (e.g., independent developers) 
are more likely to engage in unethical and 
even illegal practices compared to more visi-
ble players (e.g., Facebook). Why might this 
be the case? For one thing, less visible play-
ers are less likely to be spotlighted by the 
media. To examine why firms show a differ-
ential tendency to engage in and respond to 
potentially demeaning and reputation-
damaging activities (e.g., violating SM users’ 
privacy and engaging in fraudulent activities) 
it would be helpful to consider the stigmatiza-
tion process associated with such activities. A 
central concept here is arbiters. Note that ar-
biters’ views and/or actions have influence 
over social behavior.  
Wiesenfeld, Wurthmann, and Hambrick (2008) 
argue that arbiters’ “constituent-minded 
sensemaking” influences the stigmatization 
process.  They have identified three catego-
ries of “arbiters”—social, legal, and economic. 
Social arbiters include members of the press, 
governance watchdog groups, academics, 
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and activists. Legal arbiters are those who 
enforce rules and regulations. Economic arbi-
ters make decisions about engaging in eco-
nomic exchange with individuals. 
News media reports serve as an intermediary 
affecting the perceptions of the market audi-
ence about a firm’s scandalous and “noncon-
forming” behaviors (Rindova, Pollock, and 
Hayward, 2006). Media reports have also 
played a critical role in the criminalization of 
computer crimes (Hollinger and Lanza-
Kaduce, 1988). Prior research indicates that 
the extent to which arbiters and other external 
actors criticize, devalue, or question a firm 
(following a reputation-damaging event) is a 
function of the firm’s external visibility and 
reputation (Rhee and Valdez, 2009). In the 
automobile industry, for instance, media are 
more likely to target and write negative com-
ments on recalls by higher reputation au-
tomakers than on the lower reputation au-
tomakers (Haunschild and Rhee, 2004; Rhee 
and Haunschild, 2006). Consistent with theo-
ry, SM actors with a higher degree of external 
visibility seem to experience more scrutiny 
and direct more efforts toward preventing pri-
vacy and security breaches.  
In April 2010, four U.S. Senators argued that 
Facebook needed to enhance privacy 
measures (Liedtke, 2010). The Electronic Pri-
vacy Information Centre and 15 other groups 
filed a complaint about Facebook's instant 
personalization with the Federal Trade Com-
mission in May 2010 (Cowan, 2010). The 
Federal Trade Commission examined the pri-
vacy and data collection practices of social 
networking sites including Facebook (Liedtke, 
2010). Likewise, in March 2010, Jim Gamble, 
chief executive of the Child Exploitation and 
Online Protection (CEOP) criticized  Face-
book  after investigators found that a convict-
ed murderer met  his teenage victim through 
a fake Facebook profile (Belfast Telegraph, 
2010).  
Facebook and other SM sites responded by 
announcing some security measures. For in-
stance, Bebo and Facebook introduced the 
safety application ClickCEOP.  ClickCEOP 
buttons were developed to protect users un-
der 18 from cyber-bullies and other abuses. 
That may be a small comfort for Facebook 
users’, parents. Likewise, Facebook Beacon, 
which allowed sharing users' activity on third-
party sites (e.g., eBay and Fandango) with 
friends was modified following complaints 
from users and privacy advocacy groups 
(Fletcher and Ford, 2010). 
Cognitive Institutions 
The institutions associated with cognitive 
programs are built on mental maps of individ-
ual users and thus function primarily at the 
individual level (Huff, 1990). Many effects can 
serve as cognitive feedback depending on 
the nature and motivation of the actor. Put 
differently, cognitive systems influence the 
lens through which users view the risks in-
volved in SM (Scott, 2001). SM users’ skills, 
expertise, experience, knowledge, and tech-
nical know-how can be considered as com-
ponents of interest for cognitive institutions. 
Precautionary measures 
Most SM users are found to perform poorly in 
risk assessment exercises involving their in-
formation online. The Australian Federal Po-
lice AFP's high tech crime group recently 
conducted a trial among a group of Facebook 
users and found that 98 % of them had put 
enough information on their personal pages 
to allow identities to be stolen (Neighbour, 
2010). Similarly, Sophos’ study conducted in 
2008 found that 40% of Internet users used 
the same password for all websites they ac-
cessed (Miller and Stone, 2009).  According 
to Consumer Reports’ State of the Net survey 
released in May 2010, 3% of SM users admit-
ted mentioning when they were away from 
home, 52% posted their full birth date, infor-
mation 21% posted photos of children, 13% 
posted children's names and 8% provided  
home street address (Woollacott, 2010). Note 
too that according to Britain's fraud preven-
tion agency, Cifas a recent trend has been 
the rise in identity fraud which makes use of 
the victim's current address (Salmon, 2010).  
Experts argue that employers should avoid 
encouraging untrained and unmonitored em-
ployees to blog about their company's prod-
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ucts and services. This is especially important 
if an employer is concerned about its goodwill 
or  it recognizes that SM may have a potential 
to expose private company practices that can 
be perceived as unfair or deceptive (Lazar, 
2010). Professional service organizations, 
comprising highly trained and licensed pro-
fessionals such as physicians, radiologists 
and lawyers--known as “extreme” profession-
al services, extensively rely on tacit 
knowledge and long training periods (Levy, 
Goelman, Yu and Paging, 2006;  Levy and 
Yu, 2006; Singh and Wachter, 2008). These 
organizations are greatly concerned about 
security issues associated with SM . Boston 
Medical Center (BMC), a private hospital cen-
ter affiliated with Boston University, offers a 
case in point. BMC blocks access to all SM 
websites using security software from Web-
sense Inc. Users who attempt to access SM 
sites such as Facebook, YouTube or Twitter 
are shown a page indicating that their desti-
nation is off-limits. Brad Blake, director of IT 
at BMC noted that if BMC employees created 
a Facebook account and patients to be 
friends, "that would constitute a security 
breach". He went on saying that “[o]ur senior 
management has felt it easier just to block 
these sites rather than trying to police and 
manage them" (Tucci, 2010).  
A failure to understand the context of SM use 
is also likely to lead to an exposé of potential-
ly unethical and even illegal behaviors and 
practices. For instance, in 2009, a Facebook 
profile led to a cancellation of a Canadian 
woman’s disability payments by her insur-
ance company. The reason was that her pro-
file on social networking sites claimed she 
was no longer depressed. The insurance 
company said it had seen photos of the 
woman on Facebook, enjoying herself on 
nights out and on a beach vacation (Cross, 
2009).  
A final point is that younger SM users perform 
poorly on precautionary measures compared 
to older ones. For instance, a study found 
that 22% of all Internet users made five or 
more pieces of personal information (e.g., 
birth date, home address, cellphone number) 
available on their social networking pages. 
The proportion was 32% for people between 
the ages of 18 and 32 (Cowan, 2010). 
Defensive measures 
An understanding of manipulative techniques 
used by various creatures to fool their ene-
mies is of particular relevance for cyber-
crimes involving SM. In particular, a phenom-
enon proposed by Dawkins (1982) called the 
“rare enemy syndrome,” provides a helpful 
theoretical perspective for understanding how 
victims often fall to new unfamiliar baits or 
lures. The basic idea behind rare enemy syn-
drome is simple. The enemy’s manipulation is 
so rare that evolutionary development has not 
yet progressed to the point that the victim has 
an effective counter poison (de Jong, 2001).  
From the potential victim’s standpoint, one 
important point to note about social network-
ing is that most SM users are young. For in-
stance, while 52% of the population in Singa-
pore used SM in 2010, the proportions were 
95% for the 15-19 age-group and 89% for the 
20-29 age-group (Supreme Court of Singa-
pore, 2010). In this regard, the teens’ and 
youth's cognitive skills and competencies, 
and, associated beliefs are considered as 
major influencing factors on their SM behav-
iors and outcome. According to a recent 
study, 42% of respondents in the 18 to 29 
age groups were unable to answer any ques-
tion about privacy law correctly (Cowan, 
2010). Cyber-criminals preying on them can 
be considered as the “rare enemy” since 
youths and teens haven’t yet developed 
counterpoison to deal with them.  
A parallel can be drawn from the literature on 
physical crimes. Most cyber-criminals that 
prey upon SM users employ a similar modus 
operandi as in physical crimes which involve 
gaining access to and trust of the victim. The 
victimization process can viewed as a tem-
poral sequence of activities through which the 
crime progresses. For instance, offenders 
against children (such as, pedophiles) usually 
use the power of persuasion and friendship to 
first gain the trust of the child, and in some 
cases parents, as well. Friendship is a critical 
step toward gaining cooperation (Elliott, 
Browne and Kilcoyne, 1995; Leclerc, Beaure-
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gard and Proulx, 2008; Murray, 2000). We 
would argue that fraudsters find it easy to 
gain trust and cooperation of SM users who 
have no past experience of distrust.  One 
online romance scam victim, Sally Schrock 
reported that a scammer she met on a social 
networking site started sending her gifts 
(gaining trust) (kmbc.com, 2006). The scam-
mer then asked for her Social Security num-
ber and e-mail password (gaining coopera-
tion). 
Additionally, part of the fascinating character 
of social networks stems from the fact that 
they are built on trust-based architectures. 
The real or perceived relationships of trust 
that connect social networking users increase 
scammers’ chance of gaining trust and coop-
eration from potential victims. For, for exam-
ple, a fraudulent message sent from a SM 
user’s social network is often considered to 
be more trustworthy compared to random a 
spam message (Ramsey and Venkatesan, 
2010). 
Discussion and Implications 
SM providers are pushing their users a bit too 
hard to share personal information. A conven-
ient but possibly false assumption among 
some SM providers is that the Internet gener-
ation values openness and cares less about 
privacy (Cowan, 2010). In April 2010, Face-
book came up with new rules, which required 
members to share more information (Lyons, 
2010).  
One way to understand SM providers’ orien-
tation towards security and privacy would be 
to examine them in the backdrop of current 
institutional arrangements and technological 
development. For SM providers (such as, Fa-
cebook) to maintain control over various ac-
tors (e.g., consumers, advertisers, regulators 
and privacy advocacy groups), a proper de-
coupling of responses is needed.  Decision 
makers in social networking sites simultane-
ously utilize different combinations of actions 
in parallel that reflect their mixed reading of 
the environment (George, Chattopadhyay, 
Sitkin and Barden, 2006).Various institutional 
actors differ in terms of power they have to 
affect an organization’s (e.g., Facebook’s) 
outcome.  Different theoretical contributions 
and various empirical studies have led to the 
accepted view that the exact nature of de-
coupling is a function of relative powers of 
competing organizational and institutional in-
terests (March and Olsen, 1989; Oliver, 1991; 
Pfeffer, 1981a, b; Westphal and Zajac, 1994, 
1998, 2001; Zajac and Westphal, 1995). The-
se studies also provide support for the notion 
that substantial responses cannot be made to 
appease two sets of actors that diametrically 
oppose one another. More to the point, the 
substantive response relates to the threat or 
opportunity associated with the actor that is 
perceived to be more powerful and the sym-
bolic response relates to the threat or oppor-
tunity associated with the actor perceived to 
possess less power (George, Chattopadhyay, 
Sitkin, and Barden, 2006). 
Facebook’s substantive response relates to 
the advertising opportunity. That is, advertis-
ers are more powerful actors than consumers 
from the company’s standpoint. A Newsweek 
article asserted (Lyons, 2010): 
The truth is, Zuckerberg [Facebook founder 
and CEO] needs your data. His business is 
built on it. You are not Facebook's customer. 
You are its inventory--you are the product 
Facebook is selling. Facebook's real cus-
tomers are advertisers. You're useful only 
because you can be packaged and sold. The 
more information Facebook extracts from 
you, the more you are worth. Consider that 
in 2005, Facebook's privacy policy was one 
sentence long and said that none of your in-
fo would be shared with anyone who wasn't 
in one of your groups. Today the policy is 
longer than the Constitution and requires a 
lawyer to parse its meaning. Why doesn't 
Facebook just use its original one-sentence 
policy? I'll take a wild guess and say adver-
tisers, not members, were the driving force 
here. 
As to the involvement of the third party devel-
oper in the value chain, it is worth noting that 
an innovation’s success hinges on having 
well-developed systems and components that 
are interoperable and compatible with a com-
pany’s products and the creation of externali-
ties. Such products help create a promising 
innovation ecosystems–“the collaborative ar-
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rangements through which firms combine 
their individual offerings into a coherent, cus-
tomer-facing solution” (Adner, 2006).    
A final observation is that the widespread use 
of social networking platforms can be consid-
ered as a part of a more general trend toward 
cloud computing (Ramsey and Venkatesan, 
2010). In this regard, various security risks 
and challenges associated with cloud compu-
ting deserve attention (Kshetri, 2010b, 2011). 
Managerial Implications 
Our account has implications for manage-
ment practices. In light of the lack of well-
developed institutional frameworks such as 
regulations, and ethical and professional 
standards, there is a strong need for organi-
zations to develop policies, culture and tech-
niques to manage and monitor SM uses with-
in an organization.  Organizations that have 
clear policy, procedures, limits, and instruc-
tions regarding the use of SM are less likely 
to become targets or victims of various forms 
of cybercrimes. For instance, as noted above, 
apps downloaded from less reputed websites 
are more likely to pose security risks. In this 
regard, organizations need to have a clear 
policy regarding apps download in devices 
owned by the organization. For instance, 
some online game apps may not only lead to 
a decline in employee performance but also 
to an increased security risk.  
In light of organizations' use of SM in diverse 
activities, it is also important to have clear 
policies and guidelines regarding posts on 
SM networks by employees. It may also be 
important to regularly monitor online posts on 
SM sites by employees, which may lead to a 
leak of organizational secrets. This is espe-
cially important for organization dealing with 
sensitive information such as hospitals and 
government departments.  
From organizations’ standpoint, criminal ac-
tivities of various cybercrime firms are not the 
only risks associated with SM. Sometimes 
organizations are likely to become targets 
and victims of unfair and unjust criticisms that 
are raised by various stakeholders through 
social media campaigns. In such cases, or-
ganizations can use SM to defend them-
selves against unjust criticisms from these 
campaigners. That is, just like diamond is the 
only material hard enough to cut diamond 
effectively, SM can be an effective tool to 
fight against a social media campaign target-
ed against a company. A nice and striking 
example to illustrate this point would be 
Procter & Gamble’s (P&G) use of social me-
dia to address concerns of a group of con-
sumers that were dissatisfied with its Dry Max 
technology, who initiated a Facebook cam-
paign against the technology. In 2009, P&G 
introduced the technology into its Pampers 
product line, which also received awards from 
parenting magazines (Heussner, 2010). A 
customer reported that her child had devel-
oped a diaper rash, who created a Facebook 
page in an attempt force P&G to withdraw the 
product. By May 2010, 7,000 parents had 
joined the anti-Dry Max campaign, which cre-
ated intense pressures on the firm to with-
draw the product from the market (Barwise 
and Seán, 2010). P&G was, however, confi-
dent in Dry Max’s performance thanks to its 
long experience in such products. The com-
pany’s experience was that some proportions 
of babies always develop rashes. P&G’s well-
established SM networks such as Pampers 
Village and Pampers Facebook page proved 
to be highly effective to fight against the anti-
Dry Max campaign. Through these platforms, 
P&G made its case sympathetically, clearly 
and authoritatively. The company responded 
to all complaints, offered advices, and ex-
plained compelling reasons as to why the 
product would not be withdrawn. A Septem-
ber 2010 report of the U.S. Consumer Prod-
uct Safety Commission indicated that the 
agency found no link between Dry Max and 
the occurrence of diaper rash. 
Concluding Comments 
Management of security risks is a critical 
practical challenge that organizations face in 
the digital economy. The above analysis indi-
cates that the SM security and privacy chal-
lenges are significant. Social networking sites 
are a potential goldmine for cyber-criminals. It 
is clear from the privacy and security ap-
proaches of SM providers that they have lost 
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sight of what had made them great. Most SM 
users, on the other hand, lack precautionary 
measures in their SM activities. There has 
also been a lack of defensive measures or 
counterpoison.  
Ensuring that both technological and behav-
ioral/perceptual factors are given equal con-
sideration in the design and implementation 
of a computer network is thus crucial. Tech-
nological measures range from simply dis-
connecting databases containing sensitive 
information from the Internet to the deploy-
ment of sophisticated anti-fraud technologies. 
Similarly, simple behavioral measures can 
stop some serious cybercrimes. A simple 
training strategy aimed at improving the abil-
ity of employees to use SM more securely is 
likely to reduce a significant proportion of cy-
bercrimes. 
Finally, today, there is an emerging trend to-
ward the use of contents posted on social 
media as evidence in civil and criminal pro-
ceedings (Supreme Court of Singapore, 
2010). This trend is likely to affect the naïve 
(e.g. youths and teens) more than the general 
population. The above discussion also indi-
cates that a failure to understand the context 
of SM use is also likely to lead to an exposé 
of wrongdoing. 
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Footnotes 
 
1 Here is how click fraud on Facebook works. A fraud-
ster may use fake accounts logs in to Facebook and 
views the ads that are displayed. When a competitor’s 
ads are displayed, the fraudster clicks them. Note that, 
according to Facebook rules, up to six clicks on an ad 
by a user in a 24 hour period are charged to the adver-
tiser (Techcrunch.com 2009). Fraudsters reportedly 
create thousands of fake Facebook accounts with a 
wide variety of demographic information. One advertiser 
reportedly paid $200 to an Indian operation for 2,000 
Facebook accounts. The going rate was $10 per 100 
accounts if unique email accounts are supplied. Once 
the accounts are created, they use software to fill out 
the varied demographic information, and that software 
also manages all these accounts (Techcrunch.com 
2009).   
2 The concept of manifest and latent functions (Merton 
1968) can be very helpful in understanding astroturfers’  
behaviors.  Manifest functions are explicitly stated and 
understood by the participants in the relevant action 
and the consequences can be observed or expected. 
Latent functions are those that are not explicitly stated 
or recognized by the people involved. In a SM cam-
paign, for instance, the manifest posture is bloggers’ 
testimonials about certain brands, but below the surface 
deeply ingrained are various actions orchestrated by 
Astroturfers. 
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